
Military Assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa

By

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AFRICA: A CONTINENT IN DECAY

On street corners in Abidjan one can see people of all ages begging for food or money. Some are missing limbs, the result of violence of ethnic or civil war, or of disease. Some are deformed from polio. Along the Niger River people from Mali to Nigeria drink from the same dirty river water in which they bathe, wash their clothes, water their livestock, and defecate. The roads between Mombassa, Kenya and Goma, Zaire are often little more than trails of rubble, remnants of what once was a more sophisticated road network, but which, like so many other things in sub-Saharan Africa, has fallen into a state of decay. Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, is falling apart. It is plagued by overpopulation, poverty, illiteracy, starvation, drought, civil and ethnic war, AIDS, government corruption, crime, deforestation, disease, and everywhere you look, refugees. Sub-Saharan Africa is the "Third world of the third world."

What once showed tremendous promise for growth and industrialization since colonialism and independence, has evolved into a continent of economic chaos and political instability. Consider that of the 53 independent countries on the continent, 30 are among the world's 40 poorest. Its population growth rate of 3.2 percent per year is the highest in the world, and despite war, famine, disease and other catastrophes, Africa's present population of 600 million people could reach 1.6 billion in the next 25 years.¹ While the rest of the world advances, Africa's people continue to get poorer, and health and education are falling behind. Nearly one-third of the 19 million children born this year are malnourished, and will receive no primary education. Over four million of them will die before the age of five. The infant mortality rate, as high as 16 percent in some African countries, has reversed its downward trend of the 1980s, and is now slowly increasing. Life expectancy averages only 51 years. African countries, as they become poorer, cut back on health care costs and services, allowing for an increase in the spread of diseases such as cholera, tuberculosis, meningitis, malaria, and yellow fever. Recent statistics from the World Health Organization show that nearly 10 million people in sub-Saharan Africa are HIV positive. That amounts to nearly 70 percent of the present total of 14 million people who are infected worldwide.²

Africa's economic crisis has been brought about by several factors. The tumultuous post-colonial independence movement of the 1960s and 1970s invited intervention by the United States and the now former USSR; both employed financial assistance as a means to sway the burgeoning governments toward pro-democratic or pro-communist ideals. Since the end of the cold war and the beginning of the global recession, both the US and the former USSR have focused their priorities elsewhere, leaving little or no economic support for many sub-Saharan African countries.

Many African countries are single-commodity producers. The outlook on Africa was hopeful in the 1960s, when commodities such as cocoa, coffee, copper and palm oil demanded high prices. Africans borrowed from First World countries, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank against those prices, only to have the commodities market plummet during the world recession of the 1970s. Add to that the ever prevalent droughts, the exploding population, the decline in food production, and the cost of importing goods and services, and you have an inflation

¹ *The World Almanac and Book of Facts* 1994.

² "Lost Decade Drains Africa's Vitality," *The New York Times*, June 19, 1994, p. A1 and "The Scramble for Existence," *Time*, 7 September 1992.

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rate as high as 30 percent per year, and an ever widening trade imbalance. Sub-Saharan Africa's external debt now amounts to over \$180 billion. The entire continent's share of world trade amounts to only two percent of the world total. Foreign investment has been discouraged by the crumbling infrastructure, political instability, and economic chaos.³

The economic woes of the continent have exacerbated many countries' political and ethnic tensions. Political parties, often founded along ethnic lines, have grappled for control of struggling governments, often resulting in bloody civil wars. The various political institutions since independence have ranged from monarchies to military dictatorships, from socialism to democracies. Seventy-four successful military coups have taken place across the continent since 1960, and more than twice that number have been attempted and failed. For 30 years Africa has practiced a "winner-take-all" politics. The majority party usually has represented the largest ethnic group and permanently excluded other groups from power, thereby intensifying ethnic tensions. Governments have tended to be highly centralized with all political activity taking place in the capital city. There are no viable regional or local governments. The ruling ethnic group often tries to impose its culture on the minority, and has often discriminated against people of minority groups, and the parties representing them. Ethnolinguistic alliances have often crossed political boundaries, as many Africans identify themselves first by their strong cultural origins, and only second by their nationality. The fragile new governments, in an effort to stay in power, set unrealistic goals for reform, and made promises to their people that could not be kept. Many leaders, such as Nigeria's General Babangida, Zaire's President Mobutu, Kenya's President Moi, and Mali's deposed President Moussa Traore subscribed to patronage, nepotism, and corruption as a means of staying in power.⁴ But such measures are expensive, and as resources dwindled, the leaders turned to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for financial assistance, placing them deeper in debt and making them increasingly dependent.

Africa can no longer feed itself. The economic and political problems in sub-Saharan Africa have taken their toll on food production. Africa is already hampered by the creeping expansion of the Sahara and Kalahari deserts in the north and south, as well as insufficient rainfall elsewhere. As the population has increased, so has soil erosion resulting from overuse of land for growing and grazing, and deforestation for firewood and lumber export. Combined with the lack of modern technology and government support and incentive, African agricultural productivity has steadily declined. Food production is twenty percent lower today than it was in 1970 when the population was half of what it is now.

The synergism of ethnic or civil war, famine, economic failure, and drought has paved the way for yet another major African crisis: refugees. The steady migration of people in search of better living conditions has only intensified the problems of the receiving countries. The famine and drought of 1984-85 drove more than 400,000 Ethiopians into Sudan and Somalia. The Liberian civil war of 1990 caused 200,000 Liberians to flee to Guinea, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire.⁵ Most recently the ethnic war between the Tutsi and Hutu tribes of Rwanda have forced over 2.4 million refugees into Zaire, Uganda, and Tanzania. In 1993 over six million Africans fled their countries to seek refuge elsewhere for political or economic reasons.⁶ Their arrival in countries with strained economies of their own causes further hardship on the indigenous populations. The overall population growth infringes on the wildlife habitats, reduces the animal population through poaching, and reduces another source of income, tourism.

³ Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, *A Review of the Agency for International Development (AID) Africa Bureau: Private Sector Initiatives*, 23 September 1992, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.

⁴ "Dateline: Africa," *Africa News*, vol. 38, March 22-April 4, 1993 and April 26-May 8, 1993; "Update," *BBC Focus on Africa*, vol. 4, October-December 1993; "Update," *Africa Report*, March-April 1994.

⁵ *The New African Yearbook 1993-94*, 9th ed., IC Publications, London, 1994, pp.130, 196.

⁶ "African Exodus," *USA Today*, 8 August 1994.

It would be both unfair and incorrect to suggest that every sub-Saharan African country is a basket case. There are several countries which have made tremendous improvement in the last decade in their political and economic conditions. Botswana has been a democracy since its independence in 1966, with consistently positive economic growth. South Africa has enjoyed a strong industrial base since the 1950s, and has been the sub-Saharan leader in manufacturing and mining since the 1970's. The multiracial democratic election of 1994 has furthered South Africa's reputation as a sub-Saharan success story. In 1989, 38 of 47 sub-Saharan countries were ruled by military or one-party dictatorships. Since then more than half have held free elections and adopted democratic reforms. The statistic of one-third of the continent's children going without primary education is appalling, but that figure is actually half of what it was in the 1960s. The continent's population continues to grow faster than anywhere else, but education and family planning programs are causing women to have smaller families. Despite the multitude of diseases, poor sanitation, and AIDS, Africans are living longer now than they did 30 years ago. Nevertheless, these positive indicators of progress are greatly overshadowed by the numerous failures and setbacks of the last 30 years, and more recently, of the last decade.

THE BAILOUT

African countries owe the bulk of their \$180 billion debt to First World governments, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, rather than to commercial banks and other private creditors. As the cold war ended, these creditors made it clear to sub-Saharan countries that they had to establish reforms that would wean them off outside economic aid. The World Bank issued a report in 1989 titled *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, in which it assessed that the principal cause of 30 years of failure was a lack of economic reform designed to bring about a free market economy with minimal governmental interference. The World Bank and IMF now effectively oversee the economies of 30 sub-Saharan African countries through structural adjustment programs. African leaders have had little option but to accept the programs, or risk losing all Western aid. So the World Bank, the IMF, and major First World contributors like the U.S. and Great Britain have dictated reforms on a broad range of issues, including democratization, multiparty elections, and an end to human rights abuses. France continues even today to subsidize its former colonies, but at a rate far less than ten or twenty years ago.⁷

Many African leaders see the policy shift as a sort of blackmail, but proponents argue that while the adjustment can be a difficult and painful process and the benefits not immediately apparent, there is no alternative to the IMF's conditions if growth is to be achieved. Under intense pressure to reform, sub-Saharan countries are in essence undergoing a second revolution.

U.S. POLICY ON AFRICA

The Clinton administration has six specific foreign policy programs and objectives:

- Promoting U.S. prosperity through trade, investment, and domestic employment
- Promoting sustainable development
- Building democracy
- Promoting peace
- Providing humanitarian assistance
- Advancing diplomacy

⁷ "Protests Mount Against World Bank/IMF," *West Africa*, 25-31 July 1994.

Additionally, there are specific policy objectives toward Africa:

- Building democracy
- Assisting with international peacekeeping
- Promoting regional stability
- Promoting human rights
- Assisting with military downsizing

There are several reasons for the United States to play an active role in the sub-Saharan African reforms. Our domestic and foreign policy goals cannot be met unless the world is reasonably stable and without military conflict. Regional and global instability undercut American opportunities for trade and commerce. The FY 1995 *Congressional Presentation for Building Democracy* states:

The United States is the established leader in democracy building programs. In no other nation has the promotion of democratic ideals and human rights been so firmly rooted in foreign policy. New democratic leaders and their societies look to the United States for moral support and technical assistance as they build democracy into their political systems and their cultures.

The African continent is strategically located. Many countries have deep-water ports, good airfields, and controlling positions in relation to major water-ways and air corridors. The oil tanker routes from the Persian Gulf to Europe and the Americas pass through African waters. Thus, strategic cooperation with several African states is important to the exercise of U.S. global responsibilities. As the United States draws down its military forces overseas, it becomes increasingly important for us to be able to project our power overseas through the use of staging and basing areas. Africa provides such a capability.⁸

Africa also possesses important natural resources, such as oil, copper, iron, bauxite, uranium, cobalt, chromium, platinum, manganese, gold, and diamonds. Many of these strategic minerals are necessary to U.S. industry. The automobile and weapons industries are dependent upon cobalt and other minerals which are not available in the U.S. or in other industrialized nations.⁹

Africa offers a growing field for trade and economic cooperation with the United States. The U.S. needs to buy African raw materials; Africa requires capital investment, new technology, managerial skills, and markets to develop other products.

Africa has an emotional significance to Americans of African descent.

The elements of the six foreign policy programs are administered by various government agencies. The Department of Defense focuses on Promoting Peace and Building Democracy, the elements of which were formerly combined under the program known as Security Assistance.

The United States policy of Promoting Peace seeks to assist selected African militaries to develop and maintain personnel and organizations that are identified for use in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity. The FY 1995 legislation provides requisite peacekeeping materiel and training assistance to designated

⁸ Department of State Discussion Paper, *Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States*, December 1985, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.

⁹ Kent H. Butts, *The Department of Defense Role in African Policy*, March 1993, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

countries.¹⁰ This program includes voluntary Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) and Defense Training, formerly called International Military Education and Training (IMET).

The policy of Building Democracy promotes the advancement of democratic governance and respect for basic human rights in Africa, by providing timely and appropriate assistance to countries undertaking fundamental democratic political reforms. The program supports constitutional development, preparation and holding of free and fair elections, establishment of new civic organizations, and improvement in the functioning of legislative bodies, judiciaries, independent media, and other democratic institutions. It also assists established democracies in response to destabilizing economic emergencies, and offers supplemental budgetary support to countries newly embarked on a democratic course.¹¹ The Military Financing program (formerly Foreign Military Financing Program, FMFP), and the Economic Assistance program (formerly the Economic Support Fund, ESF), are included in the Building Democracy program.

One of the objectives to achieve in Africa is that of military downsizing. Many African states are demobilizing their forces following the resolution of armed conflicts. Another reason for demobilization is to reduce the economic burdens that a large military places on the limited resources of a state, or to rationalize the force structure in accordance with realistic threat assessment. In many countries the military is oversized, far exceeding the legitimate security needs of the state and placing tremendous financial demand on the national economy. Finally, military downsizing also directly supports efforts to enhance democratization in Africa because large politicized militaries pose a tremendous threat to African democracy. The restructuring of the military, and demobilization of selected numbers of military personnel and their reintegration into civilian society, will require extensive retraining of retained military leaders and those who are demobilized. Vocational training and relocation will be necessary to ensure that the demobilized personnel contribute toward economic growth, and do not resort to criminal activity or refugee status.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The term Security Assistance is no longer current. It was changed to Assistance for Promoting Peace and Building Democracy by the Clinton Administration in mid-1994. However, to avoid confusion, the term Security Assistance will continue to be used in this article.

Africa is the only continent that falls under the operational authority of four different unified commands. In sub-Saharan Africa the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is responsible for Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Madagascar and the Seychelles are in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). The AOR of the U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) includes Sao Tome and Principe, and Cape Verde, although security assistance programs in those countries are managed by EUCOM. Finally, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) AOR embraces the remaining 40 sub-Saharan African countries.

There are four staffed Security Assistance Offices (SAOs) in sub-Saharan Africa, (Botswana, Djibouti, Kenya and Niger) whose full-time responsibility is to manage the host country SA program.¹² There are an additional nine Defense Attaché Offices (DAOs) with SA management responsibility (Congo, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Zaire and Zimbabwe), and four more DAOs which are augmented with SA management personnel (Cameroon, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal). Regardless of the staffing, SA management personnel must work closely with members of the African country defense establishment to

¹⁰ FY95 Congressional Presentation for Promoting Peace, p.28.

¹¹ FY95 Congressional Presentation for Building Democracy, p. 51.

¹² SAOs are also authorized in Somalia, Sudan and Liberia, but these are currently unstaffed.

develop and execute training programs and to accomplish realistic and effective procurement actions.

Funding for security assistance programs in sub-Saharan Africa has been declining rapidly since the end of the cold war, along with the United States' decreasing interest in Africa. The recent drastic reduction in U.S. Government spending has further reduced security assistance funding, and the U.S. military drawdown has reduced the number of personnel positions in Africa to manage the security assistance programs. As African countries have undergone structural adjustment programs, the amount of money available to them to purchase military hardware and services under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program has also decreased. The International Military Education and Training (IMET)¹³ program is alive in sub-Saharan Africa, but just barely, as is the Foreign Military Financing (FMF)¹⁴ Program. Again, the problem is funding.

The rest of the world is also experiencing funding cutbacks. Many countries, including all of sub-Saharan Africa, received no FMF loan or grant funds in FY94, nor are they programmed to receive any in FY95.¹⁵ Sub-Saharan Africa's FMF funding dropped from 24.7 million in 1989 to the present zero in 1994. Since 1989 the amount of IMET funding in sub-Saharan Africa has been reduced nearly 60 percent. One additional constraint is that several sub-Saharan countries are frequently sanctioned under Section 620(q) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), or under the Brooke Amendment. In recent years Kenya, Cameroon, Djibouti, Cote d'Ivoire and several others were on-again, off-again the sanctions list for nonpayment of debts. Debt restructuring is ongoing this year, enabling many countries to be removed from the list. Nevertheless, there is still an active security assistance program in sub-Saharan Africa, thanks to a lot of highly dedicated Americans, in country, at the unified commands, and at the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) who have managed to stretch every available dollar to come up with some innovative programs.

Security assistance programs in sub-Saharan Africa can best be described as non-traditional. In addition to the traditional IMET program and the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, there are two security assistance programs unique to sub-Saharan Africa. These are the Africa Civic Action (ACA) program, and the Biodiversity program. Both programs are FMF funded. The non-traditional programs include Joint Command Exercise Training (JCETs), Medical exercises (MEDFLAGs), West African Training Cruises (WATC), the National Guard International Training Activities Program (ITAP), Humanitarian Assistance Programs/Excess Property (HAP-EP), Mil-to-Mil, and Special Emergency Drawdown Authority for migration and refugee assistance. While these non-traditional programs are not security assistance funded, they are programs which enhance military regional influence, and they require intense management on the part of in-country security assistance personnel and the unified commands' Africa Branch staff. These non-traditional programs are funded under Title 10, U.S. Code, for the Defense Department, which provides funding authority for humanitarian and civic assistance, payment of incremental exercise expenses, and payment of personal expenses.

Africa Civic Action

The Africa Civic Action program was established in 1985 to assist African militaries with activities that directly benefit the civilian population. It has three sub-programs: Military Civic Action (MCA), African Coastal Security (ACS), and Military Health Affairs (MHA). The program is funded by Foreign Military Financing grant allocations to the Africa Regional Military Assistance Fund. Under U.S. law the FMS program may only be provided to militaries. Therefore, all assistance under the ACA program must be provided to the host country military and all projects

¹³ The new term for the IMET program is Direct Training.

¹⁴ The new term for the Foreign Military Financing Program is Military Financing.

¹⁵ Liberia and Zaire are prohibited from receiving FMF assistance because of human rights abuses. Sudan is prohibited from receiving FMF assistance because of its connection with terrorist activities.

must be undertaken by that military. The projects undertaken under the ACA program are a cooperative effort between the United States and host nation, with the U.S. providing materials and technical guidance, and the host national military providing the manpower and equipment. The projects are intended to benefit primarily the civilian population; however they may have dual use, benefiting the military as well. The projects may not compete with existing U.S. programs, nor with those of other countries or the host country. The program has been funded annually through 1992, when the last appropriation of one million dollars was divided among ten countries. There are still uncommitted funds available under ACA, keeping it an active program. The ACA program is coordinated through EUCOM and DSAA, and is jointly directed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs (ASD/ISA) and the State Department.

Military Civic Action

Military Civic Action projects are intended to fulfill social needs or improve the recipient country's infrastructure. Projects undertaken under MCA include the building of roads, schools, health clinics, and sanitation facilities. The program allows the host nation military to contribute to the nation-building process.

The MCA program requires intense management by the SAO, embassy, or country team, in conjunction with the host nation military, the unified command, the Defense Security Assistance Agency, the Corps of Engineers, and the State Department Bureaus of African Affairs and Political Military Affairs. Coordination must be made on project development, site surveys, procurement, receipt and accountability of equipment, and financial management. Projects can last from a few months to several years.

Twenty-one sub-Saharan countries have benefited from Military Civic Action projects, which include construction of an airfield and of an X-ray clinic in Niger, construction of a medical clinic in Cote d'Ivoire, construction of low-cost housing in Madagascar, the rehabilitation of a military hospital in Senegal, and the digging of water wells in Cameroon.

African Coastal Security

The African Coastal Security (ACS) program helps African coastal countries enhance their ability to control their maritime resources and coastal waters. The program was originally intended to improve the capabilities and professionalism of African coastal navies, by enhancing their ability to conserve fish resources off West Africa by preventing predatory fishing by foreign distant water fishing fleets. It has since grown to include maritime law enforcement training, technical assistance, search and rescue operations, spares, pollution control, Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), shore facilities upgrade, and limited amounts of communication and navigation equipment needed to upgrade the recipient country's ability to perform coastal security missions. Under this program 16 countries have obtained patrol boats, MTTs, boat spares, and communication equipment, to include Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Gambia, Cameroon, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea.

Military Health Affairs

The Military Health Affairs (MHA) program was added to the Africa Civic Action program in 1988. It is intended to provide medical assistance and training to military forces in sub-Saharan Africa. Unlike the MCA and ACS programs, MHA does not need to be linked to the civilian population. Under this program, military medical personnel receive training to upgrade their medical skills, materiel and medicine is provided to military hospitals, and military field hospitals are established. Most military hospitals in sub-Saharan Africa do provide health care to the civilian population as well, but it is not necessary that they do so in order to receive support under the MHA program. Nineteen countries are participating in the program, which has provided medical

equipment to a hospital in Cameroon, medicines and equipment to Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire, ambulances to Botswana, a water system for a military hospital in Ghana, and infant incubators to Uganda.

Biodiversity

The Biodiversity program was started in 1991 to assist Africa in protecting and maintaining wildlife habitats and in developing sound wildlife management and plant conservation programs. The \$15M allocated in 1991 and \$13.35M allocated in 1993 have been used to purchase surveillance aircraft, boats, communications equipment, and vehicles for anti-poaching efforts. The program also provides technical assistance for a game park refurbishment project. So far the program has provided two 51 foot patrol boats to Senegal, one to Guinea-Bissau and one to Gambia for fishery protection. Wildlife and endangered species protection programs are underway in Zimbabwe, Botswana, the Central African Republic, and in Equatorial Guinea. Game parks are being constructed in Gabon, and in Cameroon the program is relocating villagers out of an environmentally protected area. Biodiversity is a State Department program administered by DSAA and the unified commands.



Photo courtesy of SAO Dakar

Members of the Senegalese and U.S. Navy during the dedication ceremony of two 51-foot patrol boats acquired under the Biodiversity program.

MEDFLAG

MEDFLAGs are medical deployment exercises funded by Title 10, in which a U.S. medical team deploys from Europe to an African country. The program is sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and can be either a joint or individual service exercise. The exercise lasts approximately ten

days, and is conducted in three phases. The first phase consists of professional medical training, in which U.S. medical personnel become familiar with deployment techniques, field equipment and conditions, and education on health conditions in Africa. U.S. medical personnel learn to identify and treat diseases which are indigenous to Africa, and which are not normally seen in the western world. The second phase is a combined mass casualty exercise conducted with U.S. and host African medical personnel. The exercise tests disaster emergency preparedness of the host country, and provides joint military training for medical personnel. The third phase provides a medical civic action program, in which U.S. and host nation military medical personnel establish a clinic and provide basic health services to the surrounding community. These clinics are established in generally rural areas, and provide immunizations, dental care, optometry examinations, and treatment of various injuries and illnesses to people who might not otherwise have access to medical facilities. The MEDFLAGs provide humanitarian assistance to Africa as well as training for both African and U.S. medical personnel. The program has been active since the mid 1980s, and has provided medical assistance and training to Cameroon, Zambia, Botswana, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mauritania, Zimbabwe, Niger, and Ghana. Proposed future MEDFLAGs include Mali, Namibia and Cote d'Ivoire.

West African Training Cruise

The West African Training Cruises (WATC) have been conducted by the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps since 1978. It is an Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) program conducted annually by South Atlantic Fleet (USCOMSOLANT). The program usually consists of three phases. In the first phase a flag officer and the U.S. Navy Showband conduct concerts, briefings, discussions, and protocol events with host nation representatives, usually visiting several countries in succession. In the second phase an Amphibious Landing Ship (LST) conducts a three to four week visit, spread among approximately five countries. The ship carries USMC and USCG detachments for working with and conducting joint training exercises with African militaries. In the third phase a team of Seabees conducts small scale construction projects for approximately two weeks each in selected West African countries. The WATC program provides training for both U.S. and African militaries, and compliments the Africa Civic Action program. Virtually every coastal African country from Senegal to Namibia has benefited from a WATC visit.

Humanitarian Assistance Program - Excess Property (HAP-EP)

The Humanitarian Assistance Program - Excess Property (HAP-EP) is administered by the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs (formerly Global Affairs), and managed by the security assistance program managers of each unified command. The program donates non-lethal DoD excess property to foreign nations for humanitarian purposes, and is not exclusive to Africa. Title 10 funds are enacted yearly for handling, transportation, and limited repair of excess property. All donations require Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State approval. The property is limited to civilian use only, and is generally provided "as-is" with no guarantees and no follow-on support. Items eligible for transfer under HAP-EP are those which have been declared excess by the services. They generally include vehicles, furniture, construction equipment, and medical supplies and equipment. Countries are generally offered excess items which have been consolidated through the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS). The program requires considerable involvement by the country team to identify host country needs, the unified command security assistance program managers, DRMS, and the individual services to arrange for storage, transportation, and property accountability. The program, which has been in existence since 1986, has so far provided medical equipment, firetrucks, and ambulances to several sub-Saharan countries.

Excess Defense Articles (EDA)

The EDA program is a security assistance program available to all eligible countries and is not a program unique to Africa. It is implemented by DSAA through the unified commands. Under the EDA program excess defense equipment, excluding construction equipment, is transferred to sub-Saharan African countries free of charge. The items offered under the EDA program must be transported at the recipient's expense. Excess equipment is primarily for military rather than civilian use, or for support of biodiversity programs. Items are transferred "as is, where is," meaning that maintenance upgrades and follow-on support are not included, and customers are responsible for arranging for and paying for transportation of the equipment. Transportation may be paid for with FMF funds, provided that a U.S. flag carrier or the Defense Transportation System (DTS) is used. The country teams play an important role in assisting the sub-Saharan customers both in identifying their requirements, and in determining their capability to support the equipment. The military departments determine what is excess, and after reviewing the requirements of potential customers, recommend an allocation of excess assets to the EDA Coordinating Committee. The Committee, co-chaired by DSAA and the Department of State/PM/DRSA, with representatives from the Department of Commerce and regional and functional policy offices in the Department of Defense, agree on a final allocation of articles. Equipment which has been transferred from the Military Departments to the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) is also available for transfer through the EDA program if a country has made the requirements known. The EDA program can prove to be extremely costly because material available under the program can be in poor condition, requiring extensive maintenance. Also, the program may not include spares, manuals, tools, training or additional support. As a result, many sub-Saharan countries are precluded from accepting items under the EDA program because they cannot afford the cost of maintenance and follow-on support. Under the EDA program Ethiopia and Mozambique have received cargo trucks, Mali received an O-2 spotter aircraft, Botswana received troop helmets, and cargo trucks, ambulances, and tankers have been transferred to Chad and Djibouti, and Senegal received bridging equipment and transports.

International Military Education and Training (IMET)

The IMET program is one of persuasion by example. The United States has been training foreign military students under this program since 1950. The amount of funds available for IMET has been steadily declining over the last five years. Fiscal Year 1994 saw the most drastic reduction, when funding for the overall program was cut in half. An average of 500 military students from sub-Saharan Africa were trained under the IMET program each year through 1993. The program exposes officer and enlisted military students to the American democratic system of government, as well as to our non-political military operating under civilian control. They are instructed in the basic tenets of democracy, human rights, and military justice. Students attend military schools ranging from the most basic technical skill developing course to more broad managerial and operational courses. Many of the IMET students go on to hold positions of authority in their country's military or government, and it is anticipated that their exposure to the American democratic system will influence these leaders to promote or maintain democratic initiatives in their own countries.

The Expanded IMET (E-IMET) program is an extension of the IMET program, which started in 1991. The program is open not only to military personnel, but also to civilian officials from government ministries other than Defense, to members of national legislatures responsible for oversight and management of the military, and beginning in FY 1995, to individuals who are not members of a government. The program's objectives are to foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military; improving military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally accepted standards of human rights; and

increasing professionalism and responsibility in defense management and resource allocation.¹⁶ The training comes appropriately at a time when African militaries are having to downsize, or concede their power in government to multiparty, civilian rule. Of the \$3.7M allocated to sub-Saharan African countries for IMET in FY94, \$715K was earmarked for the Expanded IMET program.

Zaire and Rwanda are prohibited by Congress from participating in the IMET and E-IMET programs because of substantial human rights violations.

JCETS, Mil-TO-Mil and ITAPS

There are several types of military contact programs available to sub-Saharan Africa. One is through Joint Command Exercise Training (JCET) missions by active U.S. forces; another is Military-to-Military (Mil-to-Mil) training conducted by small active duty liaison teams; and a third is training conducted by the U.S. National Guard International Training Activities Program (ITAP).

Under the JCETs, active forces conduct joint training exercises with African militaries to develop tactical skills, conduct weapons and communications training, and perform parachute jumps, among other basic military skills. Participants are usually battalion, squadron, or warship size elements. Some special forces units have been sent from Fort Bragg, NC, and Army paratroopers from Italy to sub-Saharan African countries including Senegal, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Niger, Botswana, and the Ivory Coast to train the host nation militaries and to promote a non-political military that will follow civilian leadership in a democratic society.

Mil-to-Mil contact is similar to the JCET, but on a smaller scale. Squad or platoon sized elements conduct small medical and engineering exercises, civil affairs activities, and seminars to promote and assist with force reduction and demobilization. U.S. senior officers meet with host government and military officials, promoting a professional military under democratic civilian control. The Mil-to-Mil program is currently available primarily for Eastern European countries, but has been extended for Africa. Niger, Mali, Benin and Zambia are current targets for the program, which is administered by EUCOM.

The ITAP consists of medical and engineer forces from the National Guard who perform humanitarian and civic action projects in a two-week period. The program was established in 1991 and is coordinated by the National Guard Bureau. Under the ITAP, a Missouri Army National Guard engineer battalion accompanied by Illinois and Massachusetts Air National Guard medical personnel renovated several medical clinics in Senegal and provided medical care to Senegalese villages. Similar projects have been conducted in Niger and Guinea by National Guard units from Utah and New York.

Although not security assistance programs, the JCET, Mil-to-Mil, and ITAP programs require intense coordination and long range planning by the country team and the EUCOM security assistance program managers.

Peacekeeping Operations

A number of African countries have actively contributed military personnel and units for duty in international peacekeeping operations. Africans have participated in peacekeeping operations during Desert Storm, Somalia, Mozambique, Liberia and numerous other locations. Many sub-Saharan African countries have indicated that they would participate in peacekeeping operations, but that they have lacked training and equipment. The U.S. has supported United Nations

¹⁶ FY94 Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, p.27.

peacekeeping operations by providing equipment and training assistance to sub-Saharan countries such as Botswana, Niger, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Namibia and many others. The U.S. provided \$6.8M in FY 1993 and \$11M in FY 1994 to provide equipment and advisors in support of the Liberian peacekeeping efforts sponsored by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). We provided \$2M in FY 1994 to acquire communications and protective equipment, vehicles, tents, and field rations to support the peacekeeping forces of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Rwanda.



Maj. Doug Lathrop, SAO to Niger, and Nigerien medical personnel outside the Infirmary of Tondibiah, near Niamey, which was constructed by the Utah National Guard in early 1994.

Other Military Programs

For FY93 Congress earmarked \$1M in FMFP funds for mine clearing and related training, and \$2.5M in FY94. Part of those funds go toward demining operations in Eritrea, Rwanda, Mozambique, Liberia, and Somalia. There are millions of uncleared land mines scattered across the world, which inhibit the repatriation of refugees, delay the reconstruction of economies, and present a public security problem in countries attempting to recover from years of conflict to evolve into democracies. The demining program provides demining training to foreign government personnel, and equipment and logistics support for foreign demining efforts.¹⁷

Under Section 506(a)(2), Foreign Assistance Act, the President may direct up to \$75M worth of defense articles, services, or training to be drawn down in any one fiscal year for the purposes of meeting requirements for international narcotics control, international disaster assistance, and migration and refugee assistance. During FY 1994, President Clinton authorized up to \$75M worth of commodities from DoD stocks for United Nations use in efforts to care for the refugees

¹⁷ FY95 Congressional Presentation for Building Democracy, p.131.

from Rwanda. Under this Special Emergency Drawdown Authority the United Nations will receive bulldozers, graders, tractors, trailers, water tankers and trailers, general purpose vehicles, and tents of various sizes. Similar items were provided under the same authority to the United Nations for operations in Somalia.

There are other situations in which Department of Defense personnel have provided assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, and will no doubt continue to do so in the near future. If political instability continues in Africa, U.S. military personnel can be expected to evacuate Americans civilians from the violence associated with government upheaval, as they have done recently in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. The U.S. military also conducted humanitarian assistance missions in Somalia with Operation Restore Hope; and in Zaire, U.S. troops are currently providing food, tents, water, and medical supplies to Rwandan refugees in Operation Support Hope. In both these situations U.S. security assistance personnel in country have been involved. The evacuation of Americans in Rwanda involved embassy and security assistance personnel from Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire. The evacuation of Americans in Liberia involved personnel from Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal. Operations in Somalia and in Zaire continue to require Kenya to act as a staging location for equipment and personnel, and security assistance personnel are involved in the logistics flow, even though none of these missions is a part of security assistance.

CONCLUSION

As resources and the size of our military forces continue to dwindle, it becomes imperative that the Defense Department becomes increasingly innovative and flexible in finding low-cost ways to remain engaged in Africa. Much of the burden of innovation and execution rests with the security assistance program managers, those in country, those at the unified commands, and those at the Military Departments. But the SAOs in country have the tremendous task of communicating with the host country defense representatives to assess their needs, capabilities, and goals, and to plan and coordinate executable programs that will contribute to the accomplishment of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives as well as those of the African country. This is no easy accomplishment, given the differences in language, culture, and the often stark surroundings in which the SAO personnel must work. Many of the security assistance programs and the Title 10 programs essentially duplicate one another, but are administered by different organizations, adding to the frustration experienced by SAOs and unified commands in keeping viable assistance programs alive in Africa. Working the sub-Saharan Africa security assistance programs and issues is a challenge for everyone involved, given the conditions on the continent; and the dedication of those people who make it a success, regardless of their position or location, deserves recognition.

There are many other programs for sub-Saharan Africa funded by the United States which do not involve the U.S. military or the Department of Defense. The Economic Support Fund provides for programs under the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in the areas of education, agricultural development, health care and more. Additionally, there are numerous private American and international agencies, such as the Red Cross, CARE, and UNICEF, which provide relief to Africa in a variety of ways.

Africa's plight, as well as its resources and potential has captured international attention. Other countries are contributing to Africa's economic and political recovery. Germany, Japan, France, Belgium, Portugal, and the United Kingdom have all established civic action projects ranging from road and housing construction to health care and environmental protection programs. Unfortunately, there is only so much money and equipment available to be spread around. Therefore, the available assistance programs sponsored by the United States, the United Nations, and the rest of the world, should be focused on countries that show the most promise for improvement, with whom we can hope to get some return for our investment. To try to assist every sub-Saharan country in an effort to build democracy, promote peace, and reduce regional

and global instability is a commendable goal, but not one that can be achieved effectively with the limited resources available.

The global recession has caused virtually all foreign contributors to reduce their assistance to Africa, and as resources continue to decline, we must become more selective in the countries to whom we provide assistance. Countries such as Rwanda, Angola, Zaire, Liberia, and Somalia are among those where ethnic strife and political and economic instability are so severe that the limited programs offered by the United States and the rest of the world can hope to make little if any impact. Our Judeo-Christian ethics of the First World and the International Declaration of Human Rights have proved to be a failure when applied to the tribal cultures of these and many other sub-Saharan African countries. We must concentrate on only those sub-Saharan countries who are interested in helping themselves, in which our programs will have a sustainable impact. At least that way, with steady, innovative, strategically planned assistance projects for selected countries, there is a good chance that the next 30 years will show an improvement to the economies and conditions of at least some of the sub-Saharan countries.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Joanne Bernstein is an Instructor and Director of the Sub-Saharan Africa Seminar at DISAM. She visited Senegal, Niger, Botswana, Kenya, and Cote d'Ivoire earlier this year, and had an opportunity to see the living conditions as well as the results of U.S. military programs in Africa. Major Bernstein serves in the Army Quartermaster Corps. Her assignments have included command, staff, and instructor positions in the United States and Germany. She holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Miami, Florida; a Masters of Education degree from Campbell University, North Carolina; and a Master of Science degree from Central Michigan University.